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Antidiscrimination Law and the
Multiracial Experience:
A Reply to Nancy Leong
TINA FERNANDES*
Introduction
The engagement between multiracial people' and the law in
America represents an example of the clash between the complexity
of what it means to be a human being and the highly structural
character of the law understood as a mechanism for social control.2
While being a human being means to have a variety of physical,
mental, emotional, and social characteristics, many of which change
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Pennsylvania, Dr. William Gay of the University of North Carolina at Charlotte, Dr.
Naomi Zack of the University of Oregon, the editors of the Hastings Race and Poverty
Law Journal, and all of her wonderful students for their thoughtful feedback on the
arguments contained in this article.
1. I will use the terms "multiracial people," "multiracial individuals," and
"multiracial persons" to refer to the set of persons with which Professor Nancy Leong is
concerned in her paper, Judicial Erasure of Mixed-Race Discrimination, which I am replying
to here. Although Professor Leong often refers to this set of persons as "individuals
perceived as multiracial," I find this terminology cumbersome, and in my view usage of
this terminology on her part is meant more to convey that race in general is biologically
unreal than to deny that multiracial people have a very real social ontology. However,
where it is important for the exposition of Professor Leong's argument to refer to this set
of persons as "individuals perceived as multiracial," I will do so.
2. See Steven Vago, Law and Society 203-270 (3rd ed. 2009), for an account of law as
social control.
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over time through interaction with other human beings and the
environment, the law is set up to be highly formalistic to provide an
ostensibly clear basis for judges to make decisions about disputes
between parties over social goods. As a result, when real human
beings come in contact with the law, otherwise legitimate legal
claims often fall through the cracks simply because the law has no
way to process them. Adding to this confusion, the decision-making
process in which judges participate in order to resolve disputes
involves numerous judgment calls about what the relevant facts are,
what the applicable law is, and how to best map law on to facts. For
this reason, court decisions can be understood as always and
necessarily interpretive in character.3 This is particularly the case
when multiracial people come in contact with the law because the
American legal system has a long history of thinking about human
beings in terms of biologically distinct, clearly distinguishable races,
and of attempting to keep these races both theoretically and
physically separate. 4
3. This take on how judges decide cases is rooted in the critical legal studies
movement that originated in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Conceptually based in
critical Marxism and the critical theory of the Frankfurt School, critical legal studies
holds that legal doctrine is an empty shell. See Guyora Binder, Critical Legal Studies, in A
COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 280-290 (Dennis Patterson ed.,
1999) (stating that there is no such thing as "the law," understood as an entity that exists
out of context). Instead, law is produced by power differentials having their origins in
differences in levels of property ownership. The idea that the act of judging is always
and necessarily an act of interpretation, however, is most heavily influenced by an
approach to legal theory known as legal hermeneutics. Legal hermeneutics is an
approach to the law that calls us to consciously recognize the role of socio-historical
context in any assessment of what the law means or should mean. See Gregory Leyh,
Toward a Constitutional Hermeneutics, 32 AM. J. OF POLITICAL SCI. 369 (1988) (arguing, for
example, that there is a historicity to all legal inquiry). In other words, legal reasoning
does not occur in a vacuum and interpretation is always practical, i.e., it always occurs in
a particular set of circumstances, at a particular time and place, and applies itself to a
particular set of facts. Another way to say this is that any assessment of how a law
should be interpreted is necessarily based in a dialogue between theory and practice.
4. The long history of anti-miscegenation laws and prevalence of so-called "Jim
Crow" laws (laws enforcing racial segregation) in the U.S. between the end of the civil
war through the mid-1950s both provide evidence for this claim. For more on anti-
miscegenation laws in U.S. history, see, e.g., Eva Saks, Representing Miscegenation Law,
RARITAN, Sept. 1988; Barbara K. Kopytoff & Al Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Racial Purity and
Interracial Sex in the Law of Colonial and Antebellum Virginia, 77 GEO. L.J. 1967 (1989); Peter
Wallenstein, Race, Marriage, and the Law of Freedom, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 371 (1994);
Wadlington, The Loving Case: Virginia's Anti-Miscegenation Statute in Historical Perspective,
52 VA. L. REv. 1189 (1966). For more on Jim Crow laws, see, e.g., JERROLD M. PACKARD,
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Kevin R. Johnson has argued that the very idea of racial mixture
"violates [American law's] monumental efforts to enforce racial
separation during much of U.S. history."5 The long history of anti-
miscegenation laws, the "one-drop" rule, laws designed to prevent
"passing" for other races, the inability of multiracial people to
identify their mixed race status on the U.S. Census until recently,
and the legal denial of inheritance rights of mixed race offspring are
all examples of these efforts, according to Johnson.6
In her paper, "Judicial Erasure of Mixed-Race Discrimination,"
Nancy Leong grapples with one instance of engagement between
multiracial people and the law, providing an opportunity to explore
the highly interpretative character of judicial decision-making. 7
Specifically, she calls us to reflect on the concept of race at work in
antidiscrimination law and argues that the way courts in
discrimination cases presently understand the concept of race
prevents multiracial plaintiffs from filing successful discrimination
claims. The fact that judges in discrimination cases think about race
"categorically," Professor Leong argues, renders antidiscrimination
law inhospitable to claims of multiracial discrimination. 8  By
AMERICAN NIGHTMARE: THE HISTORY OF JIM CROW (2004); REMEMBERING JIM CROW:
AFRICAN AMERICANS TELL ABOUT LIFE IN THE SEGREGATED SOUTH (William H. Chafe et.
al eds., 2001); Stetson Kennedy, JIM CROW GUIDE: THE WAY IT WAS (1990); GUNNAR
MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY
(1944).
5. KEVIN R. JOHNSON, MIXED RACE AMERICA AND THE LAW 1 (2003).
6. The "one drop rule," prevalent in the United States since the colonial period, is a
form of "hypodescent" (the practice in societies in which there is a dominant race and a
subordinate race of automatically assigning the children of mixed race unions the
subordinate race) according to which anyone with a known "black" ancestor is
considered black. Christine B. Hickman, The Devil and the One Drop Rule: Racial
Categories, Afican Americans, and the U.S. Census, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1161, 1163 (1997).
"Passing" refers to the efforts by African Americans to be regarded as members of the so-
called "white" race for access to jobs and other economic opportunities, particularly
during the so-called "Jim Crow" era, or the period in American history of legalized racial
discrimination-roughly between the end of the civil war and the mid-1950s. For more
on "passing," see Randall Kennedy, Racial Passing, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1145 (2001).
7. Nancy Leong, Judicial Erasure of Mixed-Race Discrimination, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 469
(2010).
8. Thinking about race "categorically," for Professor Leong, means relying heavily
on the view that race consists of five fixed racial categories (Asian, Latino/a, White,
Black, and Native American) termed by David Hollinger the "ethno-racial pentagon,"
DAVID HOLLINGER, POST-ETHNIC AMERICA: BEYOND MULTICULTURALISM 8 (1995); Leong,
supra note 7, at 470, and thinking of races as pure, clearly distinguishable from one
another, and defined by self rather than by others.
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insisting on thinking about race "categorically," continues Professor
Leong, courts unfairly exclude multiracial plaintiffs from the group
of people who are permitted to bring cognizable discrimination
claims resulting in the "erasure" of multiracial discrimination from
the legal landscape. 9 In order to render antidiscrimination law more
hospitable to claims of multiracial discrimination, says Professor
Leong, courts and judges should stop defining race "categorically"
and start defining race in terms of the perceptions of the would-be
discriminator (i.e., in terms of what Professor Leong calls "perceived
race").10 Professor Leong's reasoning seems to be that since race has
no basis in genetics or biology, whenever racial discrimination
happens it happens because someone is perceived as being of a
specific race rather than because he or she actually is of a specific
race. Additionally problematic for Professor Leong is that generally
only "pure" or monoracial races are presently recognized as races by
courts." So, this reliance on monoracial categories "obscures racial
animus specifically directed at those perceived as multiracial."1 2 For
Professor Leong, not only is this state of affairs unfair because it is an
assault on the dignity of multiracial people and alienates them from
the legal system, it also amounts to the "erasure" of the reality that
discrimination against multiracial persons (or those perceived as
multiracial) exists, to the detriment of the cause of eliminating
racism from society.' 3
It seems clear that Professor Leong's motivations for offering
this alternative approach to racial identification in antidiscrimination
law are two admirable goals. The first is the goal of providing a way
for multiracial plaintiffs to bring discrimination claims based on the
specific kind of discrimination they experience. The second is the
goal of doing so without advocating any change in the law that
9. This "erasure" of the multiracial experience from antidiscrimination
jurisprudence, according to Professor Leong, blunts the use of antidiscrimination law as
tool for promoting a more contemporary understanding of race, i.e., that race is neither
biologically real nor describable in terms of neatly defined, rigid boundaries. This
erasure simultaneously operates, Professor Leong says, to reinforce racial stereotypes
that are, in her view, at the root of American racism.
10. See Leong, supra note 7, at 543.
11. See id. at 551 ("[Tihe reliance of antidiscrimination jurisprudence on categories
has generally excluded plaintiffs identified as multiracial . . .
12. Id. at 472.
13. Id. at 530-533.
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would reinforce existing and outdated notions about the reality of
biological race. Specifically, according to Professor Leong, simply
doing the obvious and adding a new category of persons known as
"multiracial" to the "categories" of persons already existing in
antidiscrimination law, for example, would "itself reify prevailing
racial classifications by implying that a multiracial person is the
offspring of two members of 'pure' races" 14 and for this reason
should be avoided.
But, while I share and wholeheartedly support Professor
Leong's apparent goals, and I particularly support Professor Leong's
trailblazing attempt to bring the experience of being discriminated
against as a multiracial person to the forefront of legal scholarship, I
respectfully submit that her suggested path is both impracticable
and fails to achieve what seems to be her primary objective; that is,
to "dismantle the master's house" on the topic of the historic
legalization and codification of neat racial categories.15 And, the
reason a switch to "perceived" race in discrimination cases will not
dismantle the master's house is that the problem in the master's
house is not, as Professor Leong suggests, usage of "categorical race"
in the legal system. Instead, the problem is a failure on the part of
the system to identify multiracial persons and discrimination against
multiracial persons as real, i.e., as phenomena that exist in the world.
Moreover, Professor Leong's claim that the addition of the
category "multiracial" to the list of racial categories 16 with which a
given plaintiff is able to identify in discrimination claims would
operate to undermine what she believes are the goals of
antidiscrimination law 17-i.e., the promotion of a more
contemporary understanding of race and the elimination of racism -
is problematic because she provides no evidence that
antidiscrimination law has ever had these lofty goals. Instead, when
Professor Leong writes that "Title VII was ... intended ... to
eliminate racial discrimination," she supports that claim by
14. Leong, supra note 7, at 543.
15. See Audre Lorde, The Master's Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master's House, in
SISTER OUTSIDER: ESSAYS AND SPEECHES (1984).
16. Leong, supra note 7, at 543. See id. at 470 ("Race discrimination jurisprudence
relies heavily on a familiar set of racial categories that David Hollinger has termed the
'ethno-racial pentagon' of Asian, Latino/a, White, Black, and Native American.").
17. Id. at 471.
analogizing it to the sexual harassment law context.'8 However, she
does not provide proof that the purpose of sexual harassment law is
to eliminate gender discrimination. Instead, she quotes law
professor Vicki Schultz who merely opines that "the larger project" of
sexual harassment law (apparently larger than providing the
plaintiff in such cases with legal redress) is to "achieve gender
equality."19 Professor Leong quotes Schultz -as opining that the
emphasis on sexuality in sexual harassment cases displaces attention
away from "genuine" problems of sex discrimination, such as more
"structural" problems like low job status and a lack of respect. 20
Like Professor Schultz's take on how sexual harassment law diverts
attention away from "genuine" (implicitly defined as "more
important") problems of gender discrimination, Professor Leong
argues, a focus on "racial categories" in Title VII law diverts
attention away from what Professor Leong sees as the "genuine"
problem of antidiscrimination law, i.e., the elimination of racial
discrimination. But if the goal of antidiscrimination law is to
provide a way for plaintiffs to obtain redress for employment
practices that discriminate against them for illegal reasons, rather
than to eliminate racism, then a switch to "perceived race" will not
work to achieve that goal.
In this paper, I will offer a reply to Professor Leong in which I
challenge her conclusion that courts in multiracial discrimination
cases should focus on the "perceived" race of the plaintiff rather
than on what Professor Leong calls "categorical" race. I make this
challenge primarily by providing historical context to the two main
areas of antidiscrimination law (equal protection law and
employment discrimination law) and by making the case that usage
of Professor Leong's "perceived" race in antidiscrimination law is
out of step with that context. Emphasizing that the history of
antidiscrimination law shows that its goal was (and still is) to
provide redress for plaintiffs who have been the targets of illegal
racial discrimination, I ultimately conclude that the reasoning
Professor Leong uses to arrive at her recommendation of a switch to
"perceived race" in discrimination cases is flawed.
18. Leong, supra note 7, at 538.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 534 (citing Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061, 2064-
2067).
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A switch to a focus on "perceived race," I argue, will likely have
the reverse effect of what Professor Leong anticipates. That is,
multiracial plaintiffs would very likely find themselves less likely to
obtain redress for illegal discrimination directed against them rather
than more likely. I will recommend that if antidiscrimination law is
to be made more hospitable to claims of multiracial discrimination, a
better alternative is as follows: In equal protection cases, courts
should shift their focus away from individual rights and back to
group rights and identify multiracial persons as a suspect class; and
in employment discrimination cases, the category of "Multiracial"
should be added to the list of options for racial self-identification
when filing an employment discrimination complaint.21
I. Antidiscrimination Law and its Goals
Professor Leong's recommendation that antidiscrimination
courts should define race in terms of perception rather than
"categorically" is rooted in what Professor Leong understands as the
goals of antidiscrimination law, i.e., the promotion of racial
understanding and the elimination of racism and racial
discrimination. But, if history shows that these are not the goals of
antidiscrimination law, if the goal instead is the much more practical
goal of simply providing a remedy for specific acts of illegal
discrimination, then a switch to "perceived" race on the part of
courts and judges becomes nonsensical. I will explain how I arrive
at this conclusion by treating each of two areas of antidiscrimination
law identified by Professor Leong separately: equal protection law,
as governed by the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment,
and employment discrimination law, as governed by Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.
A. History of Equal Protection Law
Equal protection law originated with the ratification of the 14th
21. Currently, the boxes available to check in response to the question, "What is
your race?" on the EEOC complaint form are "American Indian or Alaskan Native,"
"Asian," "White," "Black or African American," and "Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific
Islander." EEOC Intake Questionnaire, Sept. 20, 2008, as authorized by 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-
5(b), 12117(a) (2012), 29 U.S.C. §§ 211, 626 (2012).
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Amendment to the U.S. Constitution in 1868. The 14th Amendment
included what is known as the Equal Protection Clause, which says,
"No state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws." 2 2 A look at the historical context in
which the Equal Protection Clause was created provides insight as to
its meaning, purpose, and goals. The 14th Amendment is one of a
set of constitutional amendments enacted around the time of the
American Civil War. 23 The Civil War ended in April of 1865.24 In
December of that year, the Thirteenth Amendment, which banned
slavery everywhere in the United States, was ratified. Two and a
half years later, in July 1868, the 14th Amendment (containing the
Equal Protection Clause) was ratified and then about two years after
that, in March of 1870, the Fifteenth Amendment, prohibiting
discrimination in voting "on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude," was ratified. Taken together, these Civil
War Amendments suggest that the Equal Protection Clause was
included in the 14th Amendment to make clear that equal protection
under the law for black Americans could and would be federally
enforced.25  And so, Justice Miller's famous statement in The
Slaughterhouse Cases to the effect that the 14th Amendment had "one
pervading purpose," i.e., "the protection of the newly made freeman
and citizen from the oppressions of those who had formerly
exercised unlimited dominion over him," seems very well justified.26
22. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
23. The 13th, 14th and 15th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution are known
collectively as the Civil War Amendments.
24. JAMES A. RAWLEY, TURNING POINTS OF THE CIVIL WAR (2d ed. 1989).
25. Citing The Slaughterhouse Cases, historian Howard Jay Graham has stated that the
Civil War Amendments were all framed on behalf of black people ("the slave race.")
HOWARD JAY GRAHAM, EVERYMAN'S CONSTITUTION: HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, THE "CONSPIRACY THEORY," AND AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM (1st ed. 1968). "This, of course, is especially true of the 14th
Amendment." Id. at 157. In fact, for Graham, it is "patently absurd" to deny the
antislavery origins of the 14th Amendment. Id. at 161.
26. [O]n the most casual examination of the language of [the 13th, 14th, and
15th Amendments], no one can fail to be impressed with the one pervading
purpose found in them all, lying at the foundation of each, and without
which none of them would have been even suggested; we mean the freedom of
the slave race, the security and firm establishment of that freedom, and the
protection of the newly-made freeman and citizen from the oppressions of those who
had formerly exercised dominion over him. It is true that only the Fifteenth
Amendment, in terms, mentions the Negro by speaking of his color and slavery.
But it is just as true that each of the other articles was addressed to the grievances of
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The legislative history of the 14th Amendment, much of which
is found in the debates that took place in 1866 during the 39th
Congress, supports this interpretation. That history shows that the
Equal Protection Clause was meant to operate as a remedial measure
to correct the widespread subjugation of black people as a group in
America. When Congressman Stevens introduced the Amendment
in the House, he characterized its purpose as "the amelioration of
the condition of the freedmen". 27 Additionally, proponents of the
14th Amendment repeatedly emphasized in the congressional
debates of the time that one of the Amendment's primary purposes
was to place in the Constitution itself the principles of section 1 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, an Act whose entire purpose was to give
citizens "without regard to race and color, without regard to any
previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude ... full and
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person
and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens." 28 In other words,
that race, and designed to remedy them as the Fifteenth. We do not say that no
one else but the Negro can share in this protection. Both the language and
the spirit of these articles are to have their fair and just weight in any
question of construction. Undoubtedly, while Negro slavery alone was in
the mind of Congress which proposed the thirteenth article, it forbids any
other kind of slavery, now or hereafter. If Mexican peonage or the Chinese
coolie labor system shall develop slavery of the Mexican or Chinese race
within our territory, [the Thirteenth Amendment] may safely be trusted to
make it void. And so, if other rights are assailed by the States which
properly and necessarily fall within the protection of these articles, that
protection will apply, though the party interested not be of African descent.
But what we do say and what we wish to be understood is, that in any fair and just
construction of any section or phrase of [the 13th, 14th, and 15th amendments], it is
necessary to look to the purpose which we have said was the pervading spirit of them
all, the evil which they were designed to remedy, until that purpose was
supposed to be accomplished, as far as constitutional law can accomplish
it."
Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 65 (1873) (emphasis added).
27. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866).
28. Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 reads:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That all persons born in the United States and
not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby
declared to be citizens of the United States; and such citizens, of every race
and color, without regard to any previous condition of slavery or
involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party
shall have been duly convicted, shall have the same right, in every State and
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proponents of the 14th Amendment in the early Congressional
debates repeatedly stated that the 14th Amendment's primary
purpose was to address the manifest unequal status of black people
as a group. Therefore, the historical evidence shows that rather than
being designed to address racial discrimination at large, "the
[Congressional] debates reveal overriding concern with the status of
one racial group [i.e., blacks]." 29
Professor Leong's suggestion, therefore, that the purpose of
equal protection law was to promote racial understanding, eliminate
racism, and eliminate racial discrimination is revealed as having no
basis in the historical evidence. Instead, the historical evidence
reveals that the Equal Protection Clause had a related but much
more realistic and practical purpose, i.e., to provide a legal
mechanism through which black people, as a group, could challenge
the Jim Crow laws that were enacted by (primarily the southern)
states after the Civil War. This is important because the actual
purpose of equal protection law, i.e., the protection of black people
as an oppressed group, is out of step with Professor Leong's
argument that the use of prevailing monoracial categories to remedy
multiracial discrimination unjustifiably reifies the rigid monoracial
categories as "true"30 when it is possible for any racial group to exist
as a social group even if they do not exist as a biological or physical
group. In philosophical terms, it is possible that although race has
no physical ontology, it does indeed have a social ontology, 31 and
this experience-based social ontology is not captured by defining
race in terms of the perception of others. Instead, the social ontology
Territory in the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be
parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey
real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white
citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to
none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the
contrary notwithstanding.
29. JUDITH A. BAER, EQUALITY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION: RECLAIMING THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 138 (1983).
30. Leong, supra note 7, at 477.
31. The idea that race has no physical or biological ontology but does indeed have a
social ontology rooted in the social experiences of those who are assigned a race by
society is accepted by most contemporary philosophers of race. An idea that can trace its
roots at least as far back as W.E.B. DuBois, in The Conservation of Races, some
contemporary philosophers of race who adopt a similar view are Paul Taylor, Linda
Martin Alcoff, Naomi Zack, and Robert Bernasconi.
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of race is defined in terms of the experiences (usually of oppression)
of those who are ascribed a particular by society.
Although Professor Leong is correct that the concept of race
presently at work in equal protection law seems to involve thinking
of race in ahistorical and acontextual termS 32-even adopting the
concept of "immutability" from gender discrimination cases to
describe a feature of race 33 - this was not the original concept of race
at work in equal protection cases. In the seminal case in equal
protection law, United States v. Carolene Products Co., Professor Leong
correctly points to the case's famous footnote 4 as the origin of
language that would be later used by the Court to define groups of
people entitled to special protection under the Equal Protection
Clause. But, Professor Leong's characterization of the Court's
intended meaning in that footnote is inaccurate. It is true, as
Professor Leong states, that the Court uses the word "discrete" to
describe groups that may be entitled to special protection, but a
quick look at the context reveals that the Court means by this term
something quite different from what Professor Leong suggests.
For Professor Leong, when the Court describes groups that
might be entitled to special protection from discrimination as
"discrete," the Court means "straightforward" and having "distinct
boundaries."m What the Court actually says, however, is
"[P]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special
condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those
political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities,
and may call for a more searching judicial scrutiny."35 The Supreme
Court specifically explains, in other words, that by "discrete and
insular minority" group, it means a group whose access to the
ordinary political processes for vindicating minority rights has been
32. See, e.g., Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
33. "Race, like gender ... is an immutable characteristic [such that] divisions [based
on race] are contrary to our deep belief that legal burdens should bear some relationship
to individual responsibility or wrongdoing." Id. at 360.
34. Professor Leong writes, "The famous Carolene Products footnote generated an
entire jurisprudence in which protection of an individual against discrimination
depended on whether that individual fell into a 'discrete' category-one for which the
very terminology implies that the category is straightforward and has distinct
boundaries." Leong, supra note 7, at 505.
35. United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938).
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historically inhibited.36 It is important that the very socially and
contextually defined concept of a discrete and insular minority or
suspect class was never defined as being anything on the order of
"straightforward" or as having "distinct boundaries."
The historically defined goal of equal protection law, then, is to
protect historically marginalized and oppressed minority groups
from laws that unfairly differentiate between them and other people
to their detriment, particularly in terms of access to social goods,
such as access to the political process. A switch to identifying
targets of multiracial discrimination in terms of the perceptions of
discriminators instead of in terms of their status as members of a
group that has historically been marginalized and oppressed would
therefore fail to accomplish that goal. Using the perceptions of
others to identify targets of multiracial discrimination would instead
result in protecting many people who merely seem to be multiracial
instead of protecting actual multiracial people.
B. History of Employment Discrimination Law
Michael Evan Gold explains the historical backdrop of
employment discrimination law as follows:
America is called the land of opportunity, but for the first
350 years of our history we denied equality of opportunity
to most of our citizens. From the landing on Plymouth
Rock to the middle of the twentieth century, the best of
everything was reserved for men with white skin.37
Employment discrimination law was enacted to overturn this
state of affairs. It was enacted to increase the likelihood that persons
36. As I have explained elsewhere, the concept of a "discrete and insular minority"
group later developed into the concept of a "suspect class," the cornerstone idea of equal
protection law for most of its history. See TINA FERNANDES BOTTS, THE HERMENEUTICS
OF EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS (2011). In equal protection law, a "suspect class" is a
group of people whose history of having been discriminated against in America has been
so severe that if a law mentions that group by name, the law will be severely scrutinized
by the Supreme Court and very likely struck down as illegal. Black people, or African
Americans, were the original suspect class. Id.
37. MICHAEL EvAN GOLD, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION xi (2d ed. 2001).
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other than white males would benefit from meritorious hiring
decisions. Employment discrimination law is rooted in the
Unemployment Relief Act of 1933, which stated, "[I]n employing
citizens for the purpose of this Act no discrimination shall be made
on account of race, color, or creed." 3 8 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 ("Title VII") evolved out of the Unemployment Relief Act
and serves as the basis for employment discrimination cases today.
Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin and was passed primarily to protect women
and people of color from discrimination. 39 Title VII was designed as
a guide to the litigation of employment discrimination cases and
therefore goes into great detail about the kinds of behaviors that
constitute illegal discrimination (e.g., harassment), the kinds of
behaviors that are protected (e.g., opposition or reporting
discrimination to the employer), the kinds of employers covered,
and the kinds of bases for discrimination covered by the Act (e.g.,
race and sex). There is no evidence in the Act itself or in the
legislative history surrounding the Act that its purpose was to
promote racial understanding, eliminate racism, or eliminate racial
discrimination, nor is there evidence that by "race" or "protected
class" the Act meant "categorical" or "biological" race. Instead,
history reveals that Title VII was enacted during the height of the
civil rights movement and was designed to allow plaintiffs facing
employment discrimination on the basis of being members of
historically oppressed groups a legal remedy for that discrimination.
Professor Leong cites the Supreme Court's usage of the term
"racial minority" in an employment discrimination case as evidence
of a widespread judicial presumption of a "categorical" approach to
race in employment discrimination law. The Court's usage of the
term "racial minority," writes Professor Leong, "[implies] that
minority membership is both obvious and self-defining." 40
Professor Leong says that in the same case, the Court wrote that to
qualify for protection from discrimination, the plaintiff must show
membership in a "protected class," and from this she concludes that
38. MARGARET C. JASPER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW UNDER TITLE VII
(OCEANA'S LEGAL ALMANACS: LAW FOR THE LAYPERSON) 1 (2d ed. 2008).
39. JASPER, note 38, at 2.
40. Leong, supra note 7, at 507 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792 (1973).
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the Court is operating under the impression that membership in a
protected class is "stable and defined by conventional racial
categories."4 1 However, contrary to Professor Leong's claim, the
Court in this case never uses the term "protected class" and instead
simply indicates that in order to bring a charge of racial employment
discrimination, the complainant has the burden of first establishing a
prima facie case, which can be accomplished by showing, among
other things, that the complainant belongs to a "racial minority."
Professor Leong's claim seems to be that simply by using the phrase
"racial minority group," the Court has invoked what she calls a
"categorical" concept of race. But, in employment discrimination cases,
as in equal protection cases, although the Court does indeed refer to race,
this reference alone does not in and of itself indicate a "categorical"
understanding of race. Instead, race is understood in employment
discrimination law to have a social currency that Professor Leong
does not seem to appreciate.
As was shown to be the case with equal protection analysis,
then, Professor Leong's suggested shift in focus in employment
discrimination cases from the way it currently understands race -
i.e., as a socially informed and historically defined marker of group
oppression-to a mere matter of perception on the part of a would-
be discriminator, is out of step with the purpose of employment
discrimination law and will not achieve the goal of specially
protecting multiracial plaintiffs. Thus, as was the case with equal
protection analysis, the use of the perception of others to identify
targets of multiracial discrimination would more likely result in
protecting those who merely appear to be multiracial instead of
protecting those who actually are. Since employment discrimination
law is in the business of protecting those who actually are targets of
illegal discrimination in virtue of their membership in a social group
that has historically been the target of systematic, historical
oppression or subordination, a switch to "perceived" race would be
counter-productive.
41. Id.
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II. Multiracial Animus and Discrimination: A New,
"Other-identified" Definition of Race?
A. America's Long History of Multiracial Animus
Professor Leong does well in establishing that there is a long
history of racially motivated "animus" against multiracial people in
America that continues until the present day. This animus,
Professor Leong argues, originated in the taboo against interracial
relationships and interracial mixing between whites and blacks that
developed in the United States as part of the system of the chattel
slavery of persons of African descent that existed in American
society from the country's origins in the colonial period until the end
of the Civil War in 1865. The American distaste for interracial
mixing in general and interracial persons in specific, according to
Professor Leong, is rooted in what she calls a "heightened animosity
toward Black/White mixed individuals" that was generated during
this period in our history. 42  Professor Leong shows that this
heightened animus toward "Black/White mixed individuals" was
supported by prevailing science well into the beginning of the
twentieth century, a science that characterized such individuals as
biologically defective and unhealthy, even diseased. The "mulatto"
was understood to be physically, intellectually, and psychologically
inferior to both blacks and whites, Professor Leong shows. 43
This understanding of the mixed-race individual as defective,
and the hostility that was directed toward black and white mixed-
race individuals as a result, according to Professor Leong, soon
"spilled over" into other mixed-race combinations besides black and
white. The hostility was soon applied to relationships between
whites and Native Americans, for example, and then expanded to
apply to other combinations." Mexican Americans, for example,
particularly Mexican mestizos, were at one time considered a
"mongrel race" who had inherited the worst qualities of Spaniards
42. Leong, supra note 7, at 484.
43. Id. at 485.
44. Id.
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and Indians to produce a race "still more despicable than that of
either parent." 45 Statutes were enacted to revoke the citizenship of
women once the women married Asian or Indian men. 4 6 Professor
Leong cites the long history of pervasive anti-miscegenation
statutes -from the 17th century until 1967 and at one time present in
38 states-as proof of how entrenched the proscription against race-
mixing has been in America and how multiracial animus has
manifested itself in laws that would very likely be interpreted today
as discriminatory (against multiraciality and multiracial people) if
multiracial discrimination were recognized as legitimate. 47
As further proof, and to establish that mixed race animus
continues today, Professor Leong then lists some incidents of
multiracial "animus" described in recent court cases. In one
incident, described by the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of Tennessee in passing, Oreo cookies were thrown onto a high
school basketball court when a "biracial" student entered the
game.48 In another federal court case, a white supervisor of an
African American employee who had multiracial children is
reported as having made a series of derisive remarks about the
children directed at their status as multiracial. 49 In yet another
incident of multiracial animus described in a federal court case, not
only were an employee's multiracial children subjected to
multiracial slurs (e.g., "half-breed"), the employee herself was
subjected to disparaging comments about her interracial relationship
from her coworkers who at one point left a magazine article
condemning interracial relationships in her desk drawer.50 In
another incident still, an employee in an interracial marriage was
subjected to "pervasive harassment" - a coworker even remarking at
one point that the employee had "ruined herself by marrying a black
45. Id. at 486.
46. See 8 U.S.C. § 3, 34 Stat. 1228 and Ch. 411 § 3, 42 Stat. 1021, 1022. For more on the
topic of the revocation of the citizenship of women who married Asian men in U.S.
history, see Leti Volpp, Divesting Citizenship: On Asian American History and the Loss of
Citizenship Through Marriage, 53 UCLA L. REv. 405 (2005); RACIAL CLASSIFICATION AND
HISTORY (CRITICAL RACE THEORY: ESSAYS ON THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION AND
REPRODUCTION OF "RACE") (E. Nathaniel Gates ed., 1997).
47. Leong, supra note 7, at 484.
48. Defoe v. Spiva, 625 F.3d 324 (6th Cir. 2010).
49. Green v. Franklin National Bank, 459 F.3d 903 (8th Cir. 2006).
50. Wheaton v. North Oakland Medical Center, 130 F.App'x 773, 777 (6th Cir. 2005).
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man and having biracial children"s1 -including having her children
referred to as "monkeys" and "zebras." 52 Professor Leong lists a
similar incident of multiracial "animus," this time directed toward
multiracial students by a teacher.53
The facts of these court cases, Professor Leong suggests, contain
evidence of the existence of a history of "animus" directed at
multiracial persons, as well as a history of judicial "erasure" of
multiracial discrimination. While in each example, the facts indicate
hostility directed toward at least one multiracial person in virtue of
being multiracial, according to Professor Leong, in each case no
judicial action was taken to provide redress for this hostility. The
result, for Professor Leong, was the exclusion of multiracial plaintiffs
from participation in discrimination lawsuits and the simultaneous
reification of the concept of "categorical" race.
B. Professor Leong's "Other-Identified" Concept of Race
The appropriate remedy for this state of affairs, according to
Professor Leong, is for courts to stop defining race "categorically"
and start defining the race of plaintiffs in multiracial discrimination
cases in terms of the perceptions of would-be discriminators. Her
thinking in this regard appears to be intimately linked to her stated
view that race itself is "other-identified" 54 or imposed from without.
Professor Leong arrives at this view rather strangely, however. She
begins by citing anthropologists, biologists, and other scholars for
the proposition that race is a "social construction rather than a
biological reality5 5 and then states that morphology (physical traits)
is an unreliable way of assigning racial identity for multiracial
people.56  Factors such as "style of speech," language, name,
51. Madison v. IBP, Inc., 330 F.3d 1051 (8th Cir. 2003).
52. Id.
53. Loeffelman v. Board of Education of Crystal City School District, 134 S.W. 3d 637
(2004) (A terminated teacher took issue with having been terminated for describing
mixed children as "racially confused" and "dirty" in front of biracial students during
school hours.).
54. Leong, supra note 7, at 474.
55. Id. at 478.
56. Professor Leong writes, "Although most people believe they can identify others'
race or ethnicity based on morphology . . . morphology fails to provide a clear basis for
identifying another person's race or ethnicity." Id. at 479.
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associates, and/or "behaviors," 57 Professor Leong writes, are far
more often used to identify people as multiracial. "I can't
overemphasize," writes Leong, "the role of the perceiver in
multiracial identification." 58 The logic of Professor Leong's appears
to go like this: Since race is a social construction, it is not objective.
Since race is not objective, it is subjective. Because the scientific
evidence shows that racial identity has no basis in biology, the only
way racial identity can exist is in the eye of the beholder. "Thus, we
must focus on the perceiver's perspective in examining how
[multiracial identity] may lead to discrimination," 59 she concludes.
But, the leap from the statement that race is a social construction
(which almost no one in race theory disputes) to the conclusion that
race therefore only exists in the eye of the beholder is a large one and
indicates only a surface engagement with current thinking on racial
identity. For some time, there has been widespread acceptance
within the scientific community of the proposition that race has no
genetic basis.60 Long before the scientific community came up to
speed on this topic, however, race theorists were debating the
question of the metaphysics of race (both objective and subjective)
and discussing the implications of the answer to this question for the
welfare of those assigned a nonwhite race in America, specifically
blacks/African Americans. 61 More specifically for the purposes of
this paper, as early as W.E.B. DuBois's "The Conservation of Races,"
the question of the difference or relationship between biological race
and socially constructed race has been addressed significantly at
57. Id. at 479-480.
58. Leong, supra note 7, at 482.
59. Id.
60. See, e.g., ASHLEY MONTAGU, MAN'S MOST DANGEROUS MYTH: THE FALLACY OF
RACE (6th ed. 1997); UNESCO, THE RACE QUESTION IN MODERN SCIENCE: RACE AND
SCIENCE (1961); Frank B. Livingstone, On the Non-Existence of Human Races, CURRENT
ANTHROPOLOGY, June 1962; Richard C. Lewontin, Non-Existence of Human Races: The
Apportionment of Human Diversity, EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY (1972).; RUTH HUBBARD AND
ELIJAH WALD, EXPLODING THE GENE MYTH: HOW GENETIC INFORMATION IS PRODUCED
AND MANIPULATED BY SCIENTISTS, PHYSICIANS, EMPLOYERS, INSURANCE COMPANIES,
EDUCATORS, AND LAW ENFORCERS (3rd. ed. 1999); JOSEPH L. GRAVES JR., THE EMPEROR'S
NEW CLOTHES: BIOLOGICAL THEORIES OF RACE AT THE MILLENNIUM (2003).
61. I correlate a group's having been assigned a nonwhite racial status in America
with the group's having been oppressed in America, i.e., with having been
conceptualized (legally, socially, ethically, etc.) as other than (and usually less than)
normal or regular (i.e., white) persons.
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least in the literature of the social sciences and the humanities. 62
DuBois's understanding of race in the late nineteenth century seems
to have been that while race likely has no biological basis, its social
reality is nevertheless necessary to raise black people up from
oppression. This is a conception of race-sometimes called racial
pragmatism and sometimes called racial realism-held by many
contemporary race theorists 63 and is based on the practically
informed premise that despite there being no biological or genetic
basis for the concept of race, there is no way to reach out and help
black people rise up from the continued unequal status in society
that is generally a part of the black American experience without
first being able to identify who is black.
What Professor Leong seems to miss, but many contemporary
race theorists appreciate, in other words, is that the fact that race is
socially constructed does not necessarily mean that race does not
have objectively measurable currency in our social lives. The way
we can identify someone who has been the target of racially
motivated discrimination, on this view, without buying into the
concept that race has a biological reality, is to check and see if the
person is a member of a group that has historically been racially
oppressed in America.
III. An Alternative Path for Protecting
Multiracial Plaintiffs
If antidiscrimination law has the goal of providing a remedy for
members of historically oppressed groups who have experienced
discrimination, and if, as Professor Leong shows, multiracial people
qualify as such a group, then the logical way to provide multiracial
plaintiffs with redress in antidiscrimination cases would seem to be
to simply add multiracial people to the list of specially protected
groups already in existence in antidiscrimination law. This would
both achieve Professor Leong's goal of protecting multiracial
plaintiffs from the unique kind of discrimination they face and allow
the plaintiffs themselves to racially self-identify, which would seem
62. W.E.B. DuBois, The Conservation of Races, THE AMERICAN NEGRO ACADEMY
OCCASIONAL PAPERS (No. 2 1897).
63. See, e.g., PAUL C. TAYLOR, RACE: A PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION (1st. ed. 2003).
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to be preferable to having a race imposed upon them from without,
i.e., through the perception of the discriminator. Additionally,
adding a new category to the existing categories of official legal races
has precedent in the history of how racial categories have evolved
and changed over time, for example in the U.S. Census.
However, Professor Leong explicitly rejects this approach,
arguing that official recognition of multiracial people as a legally
cognizable group would operate to further reify the idea that race is
biologically real. The basic idea is that there can only be multiracial
people if there are monoracial people, so admitting the existence of
multiracial people implies the existence of monoracial people. But
the flaw in this argument is a failure to distinguish between the
biological (or genetic) reality of race and its social reality. That
monoracial identity is socially constructed does not preclude the
possibility that monoracial identity is nevertheless socially real. The
same is true of multiracial identity. Many things that are socially
constructed are nevertheless real, if by "real" we mean that these
things operate meaningfully in our lives. The classic example of this
is money, but we can think of others.
The grander philosophical point is that in some sense,
everything is socially constructed. We agree as a group that
something is real and so it becomes real. We use it as if it were real
and live with it as if it were real, so that at a certain point, the
argument can be made that there is nothing with which we interact
on a daily basis that is any more or less real than the concept of race.
At the point at which everything is equally socially real (or nonreal),
biological reality is quite irrelevant. The fact is that our society
operates as if race were real. This includes monoracial identity,
biracial identity, and multiracial identity. It is also the case that
some racial identities are associated with a history of oppression.
Antidiscrimination law is based on this understanding of race and
the only way it can work is if it addresses specific acts of racial
discrimination that happen to real people in the real world. To
expect the law to operate in furtherance of intangible goals such as
Professor Leong's "promotion of racial understanding" is to expect it
to expend its efforts chasing windmills.
Additionally, Professor Leong's goal of changing
antidiscrimination law so as to promote racial understanding and
the elimination of racism is out of step with the purpose of
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antidiscrimination law. The particular method Professor Leong
suggests for achieving that goal is unlikely to better protect those
who are the targets of multiracial discrimination. Specifically,
antidiscrimination law was not designed to achieve lofty, idealistic
goals like promoting racial understanding and eliminating racism,
but to provide a remedy for specific acts of discrimination in the
world; and a change in focus from "categorical" race to "perceived
race" on the part of judges in antidiscrimination cases would not
protect multiracial plaintiffs. Instead, such a switch would operate
to provide multiracial plaintiffs with even less protection under the
law than they have now.64 Specifically, a switch to "perceived race"
instead of actual race (what Professor Leong calls "categorical" race)
would more likely result in the inclusion in the class of specially
protected persons those who should not be specially protected
(namely, persons who only seem to be multiracial but are not
actually multiracial), and the exclusion from protection of persons
who should be specially protected (namely, persons who actually are
multiracial).
Another problem with Professor Leong's recommendation of a
switch to "perceived race" is that she does not make clear whether
she is advocating this switch for cases of multiracial discrimination
only or whether she is advocating this switch for all cases of racial
discrimination. It seems that to the extent that her argument makes
sense, it only makes sense for multiracial discrimination. Is
Professor Leong recommending that the "perceived" race standard
should only be used in cases of multiracial discrimination, keeping
"categorical" race in usage for all other cases of discrimination? If
so, it seems that would likely present somewhat of a doctrinal
nightmare. For example, on what jurisprudential basis could using
64. Note that Professor Leong herself implicitly concedes that multiracial plaintiffs
can at present achieve at least some measure of relief if they simply allow themselves to
be lumped into one of the existing monoracial categories currently recognized by the
legal system (Asian, Latino/a, White, Black, and Native American). While allowing this
lumping to occur is unacceptable to Professor Leong for the reason that doing so "erases"
the reality of multiracial discrimination, and while this is a good reason to object to such
a process, at least multiracial persons can be provided a remedy under the current system.
By contrast, if courts were to focus on perceived race in discrimination cases, only those
perceived as multiracial would be protected, not actual multiracial persons themselves,
leaving multiracial persons no remedy at all for the discrimination they encounter unless
they can ultimately prove in court that they were "perceived" as multiracial by a would-
be discriminator.
one standard for multiracial discrimination and another for other
kinds of discrimination be justified? In the alternative, is Professor
Leong recommending that all racial identity should be defined in
terms of the perception of the would-be discriminator? If so, people
who currently understand themselves as black, for example, but
who are not perceived as black (owing perhaps to extraordinarily
light skin) would be unable to avail themselves of protection under
the law. There is also the obvious logistical problem of using
perception as the basis for racial identity across the board: How
would one prove the perception of the alleged discriminator? What
would be the standard of proof?65  Whether advocated for
multiracial discrimination only or for discrimination cases across the
board, then, it seems that Professor Leong's recommended switch
would present a number of doctrinal and practical challenges.
Additionally, it seems that Professor Leong's entire argument
has overlooked the idea that reality can be based on something other
than biology (on something other than so-called "hard" science), i.e.,
that objectivity can be based in something other than physicality. As
mentioned above, it can be both true that race is not biologically real
and that race is socially real. Professor Leong herself seems to
implicitly understand that actual multiracial persons can and do
exist, particularly when she carefully goes through the history of
multiracial animus in American society. Professor Leong is
implicitly showing, through this process, the very real effect that
such animus has had and continues to have in the lives of actual
multiracial people. If Professor Leong were to acknowledge the
social reality of race more consciously, she might come, to
understand that recognition of multiracial people as a unique set of
persons (or even black people, white people, or any of the other so-
called races) does not necessitate the acceptance of the concept of
biological race. If Professor Leong comes to understand that
addition of the category "multiracial" to the existing categories
available in antidiscrimination law would not reify the outdated
view that race is biologically real, she might not so readily
recommend the path she recommends.
If instead of switching to "perceived" race, antidiscrimination
65. "Would the 'reasonable racist' have identified this plaintiff as black under these
circumstances?" is a possible standard of proof in this scenario, for example.
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law simply allowed plaintiffs to identify as multiracial instead, and
allowed multiracial plaintiffs to bring claims of illegal discrimination
on the grounds that they were discriminated against as multiracial
people, then two important things would be accomplished. First, the
unique history of multiracial animus directed at multiracial people
(some of the details of which have been identified by Professor
Leong) would finally be brought to light, providing long-overdue
validation to the experiences of many multiracial people. And
second, when multiracial animus is observed or is alleged to have
occurred in a court of law, this animus will no longer be ignored,
overlooked, or swept under the rug of one or another of the
monoracial identities available in antidiscrimination law. Instead,
there would be a venue through which the unique animus faced by
multiracial people could be examined and assessed to determine if it
amounted to illegal discrimination.
So, while I commend Professor Leong for pointing out in legal
scholarship the existence and unique nature of discrimination
against multiracial people, I respectfully submit that the solution of
simply adding "multiracial" to the existing racial groups with which
targets of racial discrimination are able to formally identify is a
better route to providing multiracial persons with the special
protection to which they are entitled in equal protection law and
employment discrimination law. This may be the way of the future.
The idea that multiracial persons as such should be included in
antidiscrimination jurisprudence is finding growing support in the
legal literature. 66
Conclusion
Professor Leong's list of acts of multiracial animus has a familiar
ring to any multiracial person living in America. Multiracial persons
are constantly subjected to the question that Professor Leong cites in
her paper: "What are you?" 67 or, "No, but what are you really?"
Multiracial persons constantly live in what Ruth Colker has called
"the gap" between racial categories. 68 But, the question I have for
66. See, e.g., Scot Rives, Multiracial Work: Handing Over the Discretionary Judicial Tool
of Multiculturalism, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1303 (2011).
67. Leong, supra note 7, at 477.
68. RUTH COLKER, HYBRID: BISEXUALS, MULTIRACIALS, AND OTHER MISFITS UNDER
Professor Leong is whether, in her view, being constantly asked the
question, "What are you?" contains any more "animus" when it is
directed at an actual multiracial person than when it is directed at an
"individual perceived as multiracial"? Professor Leong's argument
seems to necessitate that she answer "no" to this question. Such a
response, however, focuses the attention of discrimination law more
on punishing the discriminator than on providing redress for a
multiracial plaintiff in a discrimination case and ignores the reality
that the purpose of antidiscrimination law is to protect actual
targets of discrimination, not to police the minds of would-be
discriminators.
Many multiracial people can sympathize with Professor Leong's
desire that society transcend racial categories, but as Ruth Colker
also points out, "[clategories can serve at least two constructive
purposes. First, categories have value as a form of self-identity.
Second, categories are crucial for political, instrumental purposes." 69
Colker explains further,
It is not enough for society to become nondiscriminatory,
because not all groups in society currently operate on a
level playing field. Because law and society have imposed
subordination on people due to their membership in
group-based categories, we need to make reference to
categories in order to develop fair and effective
ameliorative programs.70
The fact is that for the time being racial categories are necessary
in order to right the social wrongs done in the name of those
categories. Professor Leong has taken a great step toward righting
the wrongs done to multiracial people by pointing out the gap in
antidiscrimination law through which multiracial people often fall.
She has also added significantly to supporting the case for having
multiracial people understood as a suspect class/protected class in
antidiscrimination law by meticulously cataloguing the type of
unique animus to which multiracial people are routinely subjected.
Professor Leong is wrong, however, to recommend a switch from
AMERICAN LAW (1996).
69. COLKER, supra note 68, at 7.
70. Id.
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using the current understanding of race to an understanding of race
based on the perception of the would-be discriminator. Doing so
would specially protect many people who were not meant to be
protected by antidiscrimination law and, more importantly, leave
many of the very people Professor Leong (ostensibly) hopes to
protect on the sidelines of equal protection under the law unless they
happened to be perceived as multiracial on a particular occasion, and
unless this could be proven as a first order of business.
A better option, then, for modifying antidiscrimination law to
make it more receptive to the claims of the unique kind of
discrimination experienced by multiracial people is to ask courts to
(1) acknowledge the reality that equal protection law was designed
to protect members of historically oppressed groups rather than
"individuals" from illegal discrimination, to (2) add multiracial
persons to the list of suspect classes in equal protection law, and to
(3) add "Multiracial" to the list of available racial identities with
which targets of employment discrimination can choose to identify
in Title VII cases. To modify antidiscrimination law in this way
would be to tweak it so as to align it in accordance with the
increasing population of multiracial persons in America and with
the unique type of discrimination multiracial people face. It would
also be in keeping with the historically defined purpose of
antidiscrimination law, which is to provide historically marginalized
and oppressed groups with a legal remedy for the illegal
discrimination that they experience in virtue of being a member of
such a group.
As a legal hermeneutical approach to the law suggests, the way
the law is interpreted should be a function of a dialogue between
theory and practice, between the black letter law on the books and
the social reality the law is designed to negotiate. The black letter
law on the books today may be that the Equal Protection Clause
should be interpreted in such a way as to find racial discrimination
legally actionable regardless of the race of the person in question -
that is, that racial discrimination is problematic in the abstract
regardless of the race of the victim.7 1 But, a central claim of this
paper is that this way of thinking about unconstitutional racial
discrimination is not only out of step with the history of
71. See e.g., Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
antidiscrimination law and its intended purpose, but is reflective of a
false and misleading understanding of what "race" is and how
"race" operates (and has historically operated) in American society
and American law. That false and misleading understanding of
"race" is that it is rooted in biological reality, and that the core
problem in cases of unconstitutional racial discrimination is that
differentiating between persons on the basis of race is somehow
inherently problematic or unconstitutional. The stated rationale for
this conception of what is problematic about racial discrimination is
usually some version of the observation that there can be no legally
meaningful connection between a person's "race" and his or right to
social goods, such as employment or the right to attend a decent
public school. But, while this observation is certainly true enough, it
bears little relationship to the historical purpose of
antidiscrimination law, which the record shows was remedial.
As Justice Thurgood Marshall noted in his dissent in City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., "In separating those groups
that [qualify for special protection under the Equal Protection
Clause] from those that [do] not, . . . a page of history is worth a
volume of logic." 72  In other words, what is problematic or
unconstitutional about racial discrimination in the American
landscape is that it has historically marked off a given group as
undeserving and inferior. Racial discrimination, on this view, is not
problematic or unconstitutional per se but owing to the history of
denying certain groups access to social goods.
It is within the context of the current false and misleading
concept of race and the role it plays in antidiscrimination law that
Professor Leong has written her article. If racial discrimination per
se, or in the abstract, is the problem, then, yes, using the law to
prevent it from occurring wherever and whenever it occurs is
justified. This would include punishing alleged discriminators
whenever and wherever they use "race" to make an adverse
employment decision or deny someone admission to medical school,
for example, regardless of the "race" of the targeted person in
question. But, if the problem to be addressed by antidiscrimination
law is instead, as the historical record shows, righting the wrongs done
72. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432,459 n.4 (1985)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (internal quotation omitted).
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by discrimination against members of historically oppressed groups, then
adjudication of discrimination cases should include accurate
identification of those to be provided redress. In other words,
Professor Leong's focus on punishing alleged discriminators rather
than providing redress for victims of discrimination is consistent
with the current state of the law. But, the current state of the law is
out of step with the intent behind antidiscrimination law.
In summary, Professor Leong has effectively shown that
multiracial people, as a group, have experienced the kind of
"animus" that should qualify them as deserving of special protection
in antidiscrimination cases. The solution to this problem that
involves an accurate understanding of how the concepts of race and
racial discrimination operate in American society, however, is to
simply add multiracial persons to the groups of persons already
deserving of special protection rather than, as Professor Leong
suggests, a switch to what she calls "perceived race."
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